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 Yamaoke Michiko was heading to work on 6 August 1945 when “a living hell” erupted in 
front of her.
1
 Heard up to fifteen miles away, the explosion released energy in the form of light, 
heat, radiation, and pressure.
2
 Many believed using such a weapon was the correct action to 
take, including President Truman. Others, such as General Dwight D. Eisenhower, disagreed and 
felt that the Allies’ new doomsday device was an “awful thing.”
3
 Was it better to have 
decimated 200,000 people, or would it have been more civilized to continue firebombing 
Japanese cities or mount a risky invasion using an initial force of seven times that used in 
Normandy? Each possibility called for the destruction of numerous buildings and hundreds of 
thousands, if not millions, of deaths throughout the archipelago. Truman had to choose from 
these horrific options the one which would cause the least structural damage and lowest loss of 
life as compared to the alternatives, and therefore decided to drop the atomic bombs. 
At the urging and with the assistance of his pupils, Leo Szilard and Eugene Wigner, 
Einstein drafted a letter informing President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 11 October 1939 
concerning the possibility that German scientists were researching a devise more destructive 
than any ever before witnessed: the atomic bomb. In response, the Roosevelt administration 
launched the Manhattan Project on 6 December 1941, ending the last day of 1946. Research 
facilities across the United States served the purpose of researching and building an atomic 
bomb. Some scientists turned a blind eye to what was behind the device was capable of, while 
their co-workers fell on both sides of the spectrum of how to use it.
4
  
The Target Committee, consisting of Major General Leslie R. Groves and scientists such 
as John Von Neumann, declared the targeted cities needed to be “large urban areas of not less 
than three miles in diameter”.
5
 James Byrnes, head of the Office of War Mobilization (1943-
1945), added “that the bomb be used … against a target centering on a Japanese war plant 
surrounded by civilian housing.”
6
 In compliance with these two requirements, the main targets 
were chosen on 27 April, 1945. At the top of the list was Hiroshima because it was “the largest 
untouched target not on the 21
st
 Bomber Command priority list.”
7
 One of the alternative 
targets was Nagasaki due to its importance as a military and naval base.  
Before the final decision was required, President Roosevelt died in April 1945, leaving 
the United States in the hands of its Vice President, Harry S. Truman. A few days later, Truman 
received a letter from Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson concerning a “highly secret matter” to 
which he added that “you ought to know about it without much further delay.”
8
 The following 
day Stimson briefed Truman about the Manhattan Project and the atomic bomb’s 
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 development. After the discovery, Truman felt these new weapons were “the greatest thing in 
history” due to their potential to end the war.
 9
 
When questioned after the war about his decision, Truman stated, 
 
I was greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl 
Harbor and their murder of our prisoners of war. The only language they seem to 
understand is one we have been using to bombard them. When you have to deal 
with a beast you have to treat him as a beast.
10
 
 
Despite his anti-Japanese prejudice, Truman, like many Americans, felt unconditional surrender 
was necessary and did not want the Japanese to get off easy for their actions concerning Pearl 
Harbor, the treatment of prisoners of war, and the horrors in Nanjing. This desire for 
retribution caused the Americans to deny any other offers of surrender. Only until after the war 
did questions about the advisability and morality of ‘the bomb’ begin to surface, such as its 
necessity and ability to end the war.  
As much as Truman wanted unconditional surrender, he knew the Japanese would not 
agree to it because they wanted to keep their emperor and would be steadfast in that decision. 
The Japanese attempted several times to negotiate their surrender to the Allies. Allen Dulles, 
the man overseeing the Office of Strategic Services operations in Switzerland, was approached 
by representatives of the Japanese government. These Japanese officials requested to keep 
their emperor and constitution if they were to surrender.
11
 The Japanese also appealed to the 
Soviets after the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact expired in May 1945. Soviet troops had 
redeployed to the east in anticipation of declaring war on the Japanese and invading Japanese-
controlled Manchuria. Regardless, Hirohito sent a personal message to Moscow asking for a 
negotiating channel in the attempt to change the surrender terms.
12
 By July 13, the United 
States Secretary of the Navy knew from intercepted cables that the Japanese were making 
attempts to end the war through the Soviets.
13
 The only thing preventing the Japanese 
surrender was the American desire for unconditional surrender, which Stalin reluctantly 
complied. 
Truman knew the Japanese were at the end of their rope, and if the Russian threat did 
not convince them to surrender, the atomic bombs would. Attempting to prevent this 
catastrophic event, the Allies issued the Potsdam Declaration to the Japanese Supreme Council. 
In response Premier Suzuki was quoted in a newspaper to have “considered the declaration of 
no great value and that he intended to ignore it.”
14
 Suzuki felt, with false optimism, the war 
could still be ended with terms beneficial to the Japanese rather than having to bow down to a 
Western ruler. 
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 Two days after the United Stated dropped the first bomb on Hiroshima, Russia declared 
war on Japan. During this set of events, the Imperial government debated how to proceed with 
the war despite a second bomb exploding over Nagasaki, August 8 1945. By this point, the 
Japanese people had little idea of Japan’s predicament, as the government told the people they 
were doing well in the war.
 15
  Proving this, a Japanese soldier, Koshu Itabashi, commented after 
the war that “we were like Sergeant Yoko and Lieutenant Onoda – the men who emerged from 
the jungles … in the 1970s – who couldn’t imagine that Japan had been defeated.”
16
  
An alternative to dropping the bomb was to invade the Japanese archipelago. The 
Japanese Supreme Council convened exactly one year after the Normandy Invasion to combat 
this possibility and discuss its options. At the same time, the military standpoint of Japan 
changed to attrition tactics.
17
 To defend the archipelago, the Kaiso Cabinet (July 1944- August 
1945) emphasized “fighting the enemy ‘in the interior [of the island]’ ” in order to draw them 
away from constant Allied naval and air support.
18
 Dubbed Operation Decision, the island’s 
defensive plan called for converting 10,000 trainer planes into suicide planes. Stationed on the 
beaches would be 2,350,000 trained troops, supported by 4 million army and navy civilian 
employees. Finally, 28 million civilians were to be charged with defending the island.
19
 The 
Japanese government was prepared to turn the island into another Iwo Jima, sacrificing as 
many people as needed. To exemplify this, Anomi believed “the use of suicide squads, a levée 
en masse, and the invincible spirit of Japan would result in a victorious, decisive stand for the 
homeland.”
20
 Several options the Supreme Council considered included: massive kamikaze 
plane attacks, ‘Bonzai’ charges on the ground as well as human torpedoes and rocket bombs.
21
 
Around the middle of June 1945, the need to invade the main island of Japan was still a 
possibility for the Allies.
22
 They scheduled the assault on Japan for 1 November 1945 calling for 
an initial 767,000 troops.
23
 Later on, a total of 1.5 million Allied troops, seven times the number 
used to take the Normandy beaches, were committed to the landing, with an additional 3 
million in reserve.
24
 If the Allies invaded Japan, a massacre would have ensued. Though the 
Japanese citizens lacked the weaponry and capability of those who defended Iwo Jima against 
United States Marines, fighting for their homeland could cause them to fight just as fiercely. 
Based on the Allied commander’s opinions, it is estimated that 1,000,000 American and 
500,000 British casualties would result in the invasion of Japan with an additional 10,000,000 to 
20,000,000 Japanese casualties in the defense of their homeland.
25
 “William Manchester wrote, 
‘you think of the lives which would have been lost in an invasion of Japan’s home islands … and 
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 you thank God for the atomic bomb.’ ”
26
 Many who knew of this invasion plan agreed with the 
use of the atomic bombs due to the vast number of expected casualties on both sides.  
Some believed the end of the war was imminent without dropping the atomic bombs on 
Japan. By April 1945, General Curtis LeMay believed the war would end by September, if not 
October, through air raids alone.
27
 The bombs “had nothing to do with the end of the war,” but 
Allied air supremacy could bring about unconditional surrender, nullifying the need for an 
invasion.
28
 The night of 9 March 1945, the first incendiary raid carried out by 334 B-29s is 
LeMay’s case in point. In this single run, 40% of Tokyo was burnt to the ground killing 83,000 
and injuring an additional 102,000 occupants.
29
 The flames were so hot that “water boiled in 
canals, glass melted, and heat from updrafts destroyed some bombers.”
30
 By the end of the war 
the United States had perfected these attacks as proven in the 1 August air raid. During this 
raid, napalm burned 80% of Hachioji, 65% of Nagaoka and 99.5% of Toyama.
31
 American air 
supremacy over Japan toward the later part of the war allowed Allied planes to firebomb 
Japanese cities with a success rate of 65-99%, killing numerous civilians and destroying 
significant sections of the cities. Based on this information, how many more Japanese would 
have been killed if the firebombing of Japanese cities continued? From these conventional 
raids, one out of every four homes were destroyed and as many as four million citizens were 
displaced in Tokyo alone. 
32
 
This tactic would have caused the war to last longer and the delay caused by 
negotiations would have caused the casualties to double, according to estimates. The atomic 
bomb dropped on Hiroshima was equivalent to 220 fully loaded B-29s, showing that “a single 
atomic explosion represented no order-of-magnitude increase in destructiveness over a 
conventional air raid.”
33
 The atomic bomb ended conventional bombing of Japanese cities 
several months earlier than projected.
34
 Based on supply usage and allied bombings, the 
Japanese leaders believed the war would have been over by the end of 1945 if not before 
November 1. By this time, thousands more Japanese would have died due to the Russian 
invasion and continual air raid bombings.
35
  
As agreed at Potsdam, the Soviet Union entered the Pacific Theatre in August, three 
months after the surrender of Germany, with the invasion of Japanese-held Manchuria.
36
 
American leaders, however, seemed to have preferred using the atomic bombs to the Soviets 
entering the war. America wanted the war to end as soon as possible to prevent the Soviets 
from gaining much of the Manchuria region thus negating a Soviet occupation zone in East Asia, 
similar to the one in Germany.
37
 Truman believed that “our dropping of the atomic bomb on 
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 Japan… forced Russia to reconsider her position in the Far East.”
38
 Secretary Stimson stated that 
those such as Byrnes were anxious to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians got 
involved.
39
 Ending the war a few days after the Soviet invasion prevented a Pro-Soviet Iron 
Curtain to form in the Pacific, despite several countries becoming communist within thirty years 
following the war. This new weapon gave the United States a significant bargaining chip for 
negotiating with other countries. American leaders felt the bomb’s destructiveness would 
intimidate the Soviets, making them more manageable in Europe. After Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, Byrnes launched a “diplomatic offensive” against the Soviet control in Eastern Europe 
in an attempt to make them soften their position.
40
 
When Einstein heard of the Manhattan Project’s progress, he began to regret informing 
the Roosevelt administration of the bomb. Central to his misgivings was the danger of what the 
technology could unleash. To express his concerns, Einstein wrote fellow scientist Niels Bohr in 
1944 stating “politicians do not appreciate the possibilities and consequently do not know the 
extent of the menace.”
41
 Adding this new device was to be more powerful than any seen before 
it, Einstein did not feel the politicians comprehended its potential. Others, like Oppenheimer, 
advocated for using the bomb, believing its “combat use was attractive, partly because it would 
‘impress’ the Soviets and help keep the peace.”
42
 There were those who felt that the atomic 
bombs should not have been used at all. Of the same mind as Eisenhower, Chief of Staff 
Admiral William Leahy wrote on 18 June 1945 that “[i]t is my opinion at the present time that a 
surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan” and therefore 
felt the atomic bombs were unnecessary.
43
 
 Some blame Truman for dropping the atomic bombs on Japan due to previously 
unknown information which came to light after the war, unavailable to Truman in 1945. In his 
situation, without much of this recently gathered information, how can one be sure that he too 
would not have used the bombs as he had? Truman used the bombs to prevent the invasion of 
the Japanese archipelago, a Pro-Soviet Iron Curtain in Asia, the firebombing of Japanese cities, 
and hundreds of thousands to 20 million more from being killed on both sides during lengthy 
negotiations. It was more logical and humane to Truman to save 11,000,000 to 21,000,000 than 
killing 200,000 people.   
Major General Groves, the military supervisor who oversaw the Manhattan Project, 
conservatively estimated “the energy generated to be in excess of the equivalent of 15,000 to 
20,000 tons of TNT.”
44
 Allied commanders ultimately chose Hiroshima as the first target for the 
6 August attack. The quantity of people killed from the explosion and the ensuing fire is 
estimated to range from 80,000 to 150,000.
45
 Three days later, a second bomb was dropped on 
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 Nagasaki due to weather conditions, killing an additional 78,000.
46
 It is vastly debated on how 
many died due to aftereffects of the atomic bomb, however as many as 200,000 additional 
deaths were related to the happenings in August 1945.  
The weapon may be one of ‘revulsion’, as General Hastings Ismay of the British military 
said, but it ended the war quickly. Even though 200,000 were initially killed, the atomic bomb 
saved innumerable others from destruction caused by incendiary bombs or invasion.
47
 The two 
other Allied leaders, Winston Churchill and Josef Stalin, agreed the bomb should have been 
used against a Japanese city, and it is certain that if the Germans or Japanese had completed 
the weapon in time they too would have used it to their advantage.
48
 It was the Americans, 
however, who had the capability and funds to create such a weapon and drop two successful 
bombs.  
Truman chose to use a weapon out of Pandora’s Box; destroying 50% of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki combined structurally and killed 200,000 people in the two cities. In retrospect, 
American firebombing campaigns destroyed 60-99% of the cities and all other options eclipsed 
the death toll with ease. After the Second World War ended, American soldier Paul Fussell 
stated that “[t]he degree to which Americans register shock and extraordinary shame about the 
Hiroshima bomb correlates closely with lack of information [they have] about the Pacific war.”
49
 
The atrocities committed by the Japanese were plentiful as they advanced in their military 
campaign. For example, the number killed by the atomic bomb is shadowed by those beheaded 
or slain from samurai swords.
50
 Other acts include the Bataan Death March, the Rape of 
Nanjing, and cannibalism. To say that the use of the atomic bomb was murder is incomplete 
with examining the actions of the Japanese. Americans know of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
attacks, but the Imperial Army’s own atrocities have not been publicized as widely. 
Many consider the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a disgrace to America. 
One response to this is Air Force General LeMay’s proposition of whether it was “much more 
wicked to kill people with a nuclear bomb, than killing people by busting their heads in with 
rocks?”
51
 In both scenarios, the person is dead. The only difference being how one perceives as 
being the more humane option. The Japanese feeling of loyalty to the Emperor and the nation 
was so strong the people were willing to sacrifice their own lives in order for the rest to 
prosper. From what has been gathered and discovered, using the atomic bomb was the right 
choice. On one hand, it killed as many as 430,000 but on the other, saved millions more, 
allowing them to live the rest of their lives in a world fearful of the possible need to perpetrate 
such an atrocity again. For Yamoke Michiko and the other atomic bomb victims, the experience 
was “a living hell.” However, if the horrific weapons were not used, many more would have 
unnecessarily experienced this “living hell” if the Allies utilized a different option. 
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